HEAR: <u>Homomorphically Encrypted Allreduce</u>

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ABSTRACT

Allreduce is one of the most commonly used collective operations. Its latency and bandwidth can be improved by offloading the calculations to the network. However, no way exists to conduct such offloading securely; in state-of-the-art solutions, the data is passed unprotected into the network. Security is a significant concern for High-Performance Computing applications, but achieving it while maintaining performance remains challenging. We present HEAR, the first high-performance system for securing in-network compute and Allreduce operations based on homomorphic encryption. HEAR implements carefully designed and modified encryption schemes for the most common Allreduce functions and leverages communication domain knowledge in MPI programs to obtain decryption and encryption routines with high performance. HEAR operates on integers and floats with no code base and no or little hardware changes. We design and evaluate HEAR, showing its minimal overhead, and open-source our implementation. HEAR represents the first step towards achieving confidential HPC.

CCS CONCEPTS

Networks → In-network processing;
 Security and privacy
 → Distributed systems security;
 Computer systems organization
 → Distributed architectures.

KEYWORDS

Message Passing Interface, Allreduce, In-Network Computing, Homomorphic Encryption, Confidential Computing

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1 INTRODUCTION

Allreduce is the most used [21, 62, 76, 10] message-passing interface (MPI) collective in which *P* processes belonging to a communicator S aggregate a vector of data element-wise and return the aggregated values to each process. Summation, product, and max/min operators

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Figure 1: A simplified overview of HEAR running within a secure environment with an untrusted network. HEAR conducts homomorphically encrypted Allreduce by shifting the values on a ring, ensuring losslessness and enabling performant decryption through spatial knowledge of the program.

are typical examples of aggregation functions [64]. Many applications, such as scientific workloads [21, 44, 89], deep learning [88, 20, 8], graph processing [100, 51], and big data analytics [100, 101], rely on Allreduce. Recent studies show that Allreduce, together with the related Reduce collective, are the most commonly invoked collectives taking over 30-40% of the total collective operation time in core hours [21, 76] and making *"MPI_Allreduce [...] the most significant collective in terms of usage and time"*.

To increase the performance and lower the amount of transmitted data of Allreduce, the processes can exploit in-network computing (INC). INC allows hosts to offload the Allreduce function to the networking devices such as switches [45, 60, 84] or network interface cards (NICs) [86, 50]. INC provides two critical advantages: latency and bandwidth usage reductions. The former is lowered by 3-18x [45, 60] which results in performance gains of 1.5-5.5x [60, 84]. The latter can be reduced by 2x [27], resulting in a lower network contention and system power savings as modern datacenter interconnects constitute 15-50% of the overall power usage [2].

However, INC is insecure, and currently, no method exists for securing it. As the information required for computations is used unencrypted, the state-of-the-art sends the INC data unprotected

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in the network [45], making INC vulnerable to attacks. This raises an issue as an increasing number of users, companies, and governments emphasize data anonymity and confidentiality [73, 40, 96]. The growing importance of security led to confidential computing (CC) gaining attention.

CC refers to methods to protect sensitive data while being processed [67, 77]. One of the crucial elements of CC is homomorphic encryption (HE). HE allows conducting arithmetic operations on the encrypted messages without needing to decrypt them first [3, 98, 70]. HE has been identified to have significant potential in applications such as medical records [68, 97], biometric data [29], financial data [68], advertising [68], and AI [7, 91]. While HE provides strong security guarantees, most existing schemes are impractical because of the increased size of the encrypted message (ciphertext) over the original message (plaintext) or the low performance [3].

Performance overheads usually make HE impractical for HPC use cases such as securing INC. While security is an essential feature of HPC, enabling it to achieve its anticipated benefits [47], HPC has unique security requirements unlike those in typical IT systems. One of the most crucial differentiators is the trade-off between performance and security, where the users consider security valuable only if it does not slow down calculations significantly [47]. Such requirements made confidential HPC (cHPC) restrictive.

We present HEAR, a first step towards achieving cHPC. HEAR is a novel system for securing INC and Allreduce operations based on homomorphic encryption. HEAR implements carefully selected and modified encryption schemes for the most common Allreduce functions. It leverages the knowledge of the communication domain in the MPI programs to obtain decryption and encryption routines with high performance and low to no ciphertext overhead, thus fulfilling the HPC security requirements. HEAR operates on integers and floats with no or minimal hardware changes. Figure 1 displays a simplified overview of HEAR while conducting an intuitive version of the integer Allreduce summation. Each MPI rank encrypts the data by adding on a ring a pseudorandom key deterministically generated from initialization keys known by all ranks. The scheme provides homomorphic addition properties, and because of modulo arithmetic, no information is lost. The resulting aggregated value can be efficiently decrypted by subtracting the sum of all the keys. As the performance plots show, HEAR achieves around 80% of the native network throughput and introduces low latency overheads, considering the provided security benefits. In summary, our contributions are:

- (1) Defining a suitable INC and cHPC threat model alongside HEAR, a novel framework for confidential Allreduce operations allowing users to choose between performance and security. Homomorphically based HEAR works on integers and floats and supports addition, multiplication, and XOR.
- (2) Defining and discussing the security of a new floating point HE scheme suitable for HPC usage. Presenting the analysis of the precision loss against the gained security for the floating points within the scheme.
- (3) Designing, implementing, and evaluating HEAR, the first highperformance Allreduce framework based on MPI stack and datatype, allowing for confidential INC.

(4) Open-sourcing HEAR¹ as a library for use with any MPI standard implementation without changing the code base and recompiling applications.

2 BACKGROUND

Security attacker models: Attacker models play a crucial role in evaluating the security of cryptographic schemes. One widely used attacker model is the indistinguishability under the chosenplaintext attack (IND-CPA) model, which assesses a scheme's resilience to attacks where an adversary can choose plaintext messages to encrypt and observe the corresponding ciphertexts [58]. IND-CPA is equivalent to semantic security, where only negligible information can be extracted about the plaintext from the ciphertext [41]. Another important attacker model is the ciphertext-only attack (COA) [11], which evaluates a scheme's resistance to attacks where an adversary can only access ciphertexts. Attacker models are essential in providing a rigorous evaluation of the security of cryptographic systems. Their use in proofs offers a high level of confidence in the effectiveness of a given cryptographic scheme.

Secure environments: The ability to evaluate programs in a secure environment is a crucial element of CC. Secure environments can be achieved by, for example, using Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) [102]. TEEs are isolated, secure execution environments that protect sensitive data and code from being accessed or tampered with by unauthorized parties outside the TEE [81]. TEEs such as Intel SGX [25], AMD SNP-SEV [57] or ARM Trust-Zone [74] are based on hardware security mechanisms that create secure and isolated regions within the system's memory. While TEEs provide security of the data on the host, their communication is not well defined [103]. Existing solutions [93] do not support INC and would require increasing the threat boundary. To the best of our knowledge, no prior research allows data from a secure environment to be combined with INC.

Combining MPI, INC, and secure environments: Usually, the communication between MPI processes is either unencrypted [5, 93, 79] or encrypted using end-to-end (E2E) techniques such as TLS [80]. However, turning the encryption off for some applications is unacceptable, and E2E encryption prevents the users from leveraging INC. For TEEs, turning off encryption makes little sense as it would expose the protected data. Relaying the encryption and decryption to the network devices increases the threat boundary and requires either key sharing or attestation. For key sharing to work with INC, keys would need to be shared with all the networking devices as the ones involved in the computation are not known a priori, especially for dynamically routed networks. Additionally, this would introduce decryption and encryption latencies on the involved networking devices. On the other hand, attesting and opening TEEs on all network devices introduces further overhead in TEE context switching. Each context switch requires flushing of translation lookaside buffers or last-level caches [25], making achieving the line rate and low latencies challenging.

The current unencrypted INC schemes have two main issues that should be solved: data confidentiality and result authentication. In the former case, the INC devices can read unprotected data and obtain potentially confidential information. In the latter

¹https://github.com/spcl/libhear

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	PHE								SWHE			FHE				
	[78]	[42]	[33]	[9]	[72]	[23]	[85]	[14]	[83]	[12]	[55]	[19]	[13]	[34]	[17]	HEAH
R1 R2 R3 R4		0.00	0.00	\mathbf{O}	0.00		••••	•••	0000	0000	0000	0	0	0.000	0	••••
Ta	ble	1: (Con	npa	riso	on o	of tl	ne a	vai	labl	e ei	ıcry	pti	on s	sche	mes
wi	th o	liffe	eren	t re	equi	iren	ient	ts. R	1: A	lt m	lost	2x (ciph	erte	ext i	infla
		D o	. 1			1		c				Do				

tion, R2: A large number of operations, R3: Low operation complexity, R4: Allow for many operation types. ○ signifies not fulfilling, ● partially fulfilling, ● entirely fulfilling.

case, the network devices can manipulate the data freely without the MPI program realizing it. In our work, we primarily focus on confidentiality. We also discuss the authentication in Section 5.5.

Homomorphic encryption (HE): HE allows conducting arithmetic operations on encrypted messages. Encryption scheme with encryption *E* and message space *M* is homomorphic for an operation \star if it fulfills $E(x_1) \star E(x_2) = E(x_1 \star x_2) \forall x_1, x_2 \in M$. We categorize HE into three categories: partially, somehow, and fully homomorphic schemes [3]. Partially HE (PHE) allows a single operation type on encrypted data, e.g., addition or multiplication. Somewhat HE (SWHE) can evaluate multiple operation types but only a limited number of times. Fully HE (FHE) allows for arbitrary operations and unlimited evaluations. The choice between different schemes depends on the application requirements.

3 DESIGN REQUIREMENTS

The requirements of confidential HPC are radically different from those of typical HE applications, making most HE schemes impractical due to the increased size of the ciphertext over plaintext (ciphertext inflation), a limited number of operations, and high computation intensities of encryption, decryption, and homomorphic operations. HEAR cannot use an off-the-shelf encryption scheme because such overheads are unacceptable in a distributed HPC environment. HEAR required a design of its own HE methods inspired by some existing frameworks [85, 14]. We present a comparison of HEAR and evaluate common encryption schemes to show their shortcomings. We summarize this analysis in Table 1.

R1: At most 2x ciphertext inflation. INC provides bandwidth reduction of up to 2x [27]. As the sent message is encrypted, the cryptographic schemes should have ciphertext inflation as low as possible and not larger than 2x. Otherwise, one of the main advantages of INC would be eliminated. Most HE schemes do not fulfill this condition. FHE schemes are notorious for large inflation, reaching 10,000x for bit-sized inputs with some keys reaching gigabytes [3, 23]. Newer FHE schemes have considerably reduced the inflation [19, 18], which, as the size of the message grows to infinity, can reach 2x still eliminating the INC advantages. Conceptually simpler and more efficient PHE schemes also rarely achieve this goal. Paillier [72], RSA [78] or ElGamal [33] obtain at least 2x. Unmodified additive ring-based schemes also do not offer a solution here due to increasing key arrays [85]. HEAR bases its operation on additive ring schemes and cleverly uses the evaluated program's structure and communication to eliminate ciphertext inflation for integers. For floats, HEAR provides the designers with a parameter that controls the trade-off between inflation, security, and the achieved precision.

R2: A large number of operations. Many HE schemes suffer from a limited number of operations that they can perform, after which the result is not guaranteed to be decrypted appropriately. For example, SWHE schemes usually increase noise after each iteration [3]. Bootstrapping [39] is the technique commonly used in FHE schemes to deal with this problem. It requires periodic refreshing of the ciphertext to reduce the aggregated noise, which is typically slow and requires large keys [3]. Additionally, some HE schemes that support a limited number of operations have a variable ciphertext length [23]. The length depends on the limit of the number of operations leading to more complex hardware. HEAR offers an unlimited number of operations and a constant ciphertext size for integers and floats.

R3: Low operation complexity. Many HE schemes are complex. The encryption, decryption, and operation times are typically slow and in the range of milliseconds to hours [3]. FHE encryption schemes can take minutes to conduct simple 16-bit additions, not due to the complexity of the conducted operations but due to their ciphertext inflation [23]. Even if we operate in the limit where ciphertext inflation does not matter, encryption and decryption remain complex operations [17]. PHE schemes suffer from more complex functions involving, for example, large modulus operations [78, 33, 72]. HEAR is defined by basic arithmetic and uses MPI communication structure to allow for performant operation.

R4: Allow for many operation types. SWHE schemes allow a subset of operations while FHE schemes all of them [3]. Some PHE frameworks offer multiple schemes based on principles readily convertible to different operations [85, 23]. HEAR follows a similar strategy and implements six schemes to enable various operations.

4 THREAT MODEL

We assume three parties operating within the same network; a set Sof P processes together with HEAR running within secure environments that established a communication domain, the cluster user who legitimately submits a program and its data to be evaluated, and an adversary who has modify access to the data input methods and can observe the whole network. Due to the number of available options [102], we do not limit ourselves to a particular type of secure environment. We leave it to the user to decide their level of trust, e.g., whether they would like to run a TEE on the whole or parts of the program or simply trust the nodes. We assume that the secure environment prohibits the adversary from accessing the confidential parts of the program and HEAR's keys and methods. The adversary tries to obtain confidential information by eavesdropping on the network transmissions that leave the secure environment. Any elements within the network, such as the NICs and routers, are untrusted. The adversary can observe the network and influence the data provided to the securely running program. An example of an adversary would be a malicious sysadmin. Figure 2 presents an overview of the threat model with the trusted elements in a green outline and untrusted ones in a red outline.

To differentiate between the security levels HEAR provides against such an adversary, we introduce three types of safety: temporal, local, and global. We assume processes submit a vector of values to HEAR, and we consider the plaintext to be any element within a provided Allreduce vector on any of the processes. We SC '23, November 12-17, 2023, Denver, CO, USA



Figure 2: The threat model of HEAR with the processes running within secure environments, untrusted network, and overview of the provided safety.

marked the various plaintexts with x_{ij} in Figure 2. In such an environment, with a high probability, temporal safety ensures a given plaintext value during consecutive Allreduce operations is encrypted differently. Local safety ensures plaintexts in a process-local vector are encrypted differently during the same Allreduce operation. Global safety ensures plaintexts across different processes are encrypted differently. Figure 2 displays what we mean by local and global safety, showing sets of values that should not get encrypted to the same ciphertext.

HEAR always provides local and temporal security. We define two attacker types to distinguish between situations with and without global safety:

- Single-process attacker ①: can submit message data to one process. In practice, this could be a process to which the operator has obtained access through, for example, expensive side-channel attacks.
- (2) Multi-process attacker D: can submit message data on all P processes. In practice, this could happen at the end of program evaluation, where the sysadmin pretends that the communication has ended. At the same time, they overtake the communication domain and continue submissions to obtain information from the previously logged messages.

Both are stronger versions of passive attackers just observing the network. We primarily consider confidentiality attacks on the message contents. We discuss integrity protection in Section 5.5.

5 HEAR DESIGN

HEAR optimizes the performance and scalability of supported data and operation types while minimizing the need to change existing INC hardware. HEAR is built on symmetric primitives, allowing for homomorphic operations in the network with consecutive independent ciphertexts, yielding ground for performant parallelization. All the schemes used in HEAR can be intuitively summarized as:

$$E(x) = x \star \text{noise}$$
 $D(x) = x \star \text{noise}^{-1}$

For an encryption function *E*, decryption function *D*, plaintext *x*, operation \star , and a noise derived from keys providing security. In Sections 5.1-5.3, we define these parameters for distinct data and operation types, reflecting the underlying value encoding differences. Each scheme includes definitions of encryption/decryption,

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and an overview of performance, security, and lossiness. Table 2 displays the supported operations and their main properties. Table 3 provides intuition behind the presented math.

Key Generation: HEAR is initialized by generating keys within processes belonging to a given communicator. The initialization is per communicator, even if some processes are already initialized in a different communicator. In this phase, each of the P processes with rank *i* involved in a communicator S generates a local starting random key $k_i^s \in \mathbb{Z}_n$. k_i^s is kept secret and is securely shared with selected other processes. Each rank i stores its key, and the keys of rank i-1 and 0. Those keys are necessary for better performance, as discussed in Section 5.1.4. Rank 0 also generates a single collective random key $k_c \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ together with the encryption $k_e \in \mathbb{Z}_m$ and progression $k_p \in \mathbb{Z}_m$ keys. The three values are kept secret and broadcasted securely to all the other processes. Additionally, we let a pseudorandom function (PRF) $F : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^m \to \mathbb{Z}_d$ be a trapdoor function defined as $F_k(x) = F(k, x)$ and mapping values of length *n* with key of length *m* to elements in \mathbb{Z}_d . *F* needs to be a cryptographically secure PRF such as AES [31].

After the initialization phase, each process has six keys providing performant scaling as $\Theta(1)$ in space. d, m and n are user selectable parameters. The output length d is dictated by the size of the datatype operated on; integers and floats have different encryption requirements resulting in different output lengths. The required application security and the used PRF dictate the key size m. The input value n is usually defined by the used PRF.

HEAR relies on the communication structure of Allreduce to achieve high performance. During any call to conduct an Allreduce, the processes within the communicator increase the collective random number as $k_c \leftarrow F_{k_p}(k_c)$. These updates are necessary to provide temporal safety. Then each rank *i* encrypts each element *j* of the vector of values x_i to a ciphertext $c_i[j] = E(x_i[j])$ using one of the schemes defined in Sections 5.1-5.3 dependent on the data and operation types. After an aggregation using an operation \odot , each of the ranks obtains $c[j] = \bigodot_{i \in \mathbb{S}} c_i[j]$ which can be decrypted using a function $D_{\mathbb{S}}(c[j]) = \bigodot_{i \in \mathbb{S}} x_i[j]$. In HEAR, the local safety is guaranteed by using different *j* to encrypt different elements of a vector, while the global safety is provided by the different local starting keys k_i^s .

5.1 Integer operations

We define integer-based schemes that do not require hardware changes, are lossless, and have no ciphertext inflation.

5.1.1 Addition. We define addition on an abelian additive group \mathbb{Z}_d with order d > 1 dictated by the datatype length. For example, for 64-bit integers, PRF *F* would return 64-bit pseudorandom numbers. Subtraction can be implemented using two's complement.

Encryption: We encrypt values as:

$$c_{i}[j] = \begin{cases} x_{i}[j] + F_{k_{e}}(k_{i}^{s} + k_{c} + j) & i = P - 1\\ x_{i}[j] + F_{k_{e}}(k_{i}^{s} + k_{c} + j) - F_{k_{e}}(k_{i+1}^{s} + k_{c} + j) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$
(1)

Decryption: We decrypt as $D_{\mathbb{S}}(c[j]) = c[j] - F_{k_e}(k_0^s + k_c + j)$. **Losslessness:** Using a well-known modulo arithmetic property $(a_1 + a_2) \mod 2^b = (a_1 \mod 2^b + a_2 \mod 2^b) \mod 2^b$ we

	Int, Fix	ed point	Int,Bool	Float, Complex					
	MPI_SUM	MPI_PROD	MPI_LXOR, MPI_BXOR	MPI_SUM v1	MPI_SUM v2	MPI_PROD			
Lossiness Security Ciphertext inflation	Lossless IND-CPA TP None	Lossless IND-CPA TP None	Lossless IND-CPA DP None	Minor COA ① Precision tradeoff	Medium COA UP Precision tradeoff	Minor COA DD Precision tradeoff			
Hardware changes	None	None	None	Minimal, FPU	Minimal, FPU	Minimal, FPU			

Table 2: Summary of supported operation and data types together with their properties.

note that $((m + n) \mod 2^b - n \mod 2^b) \mod 2^b = (m + n - n) \mod 2^b = m \mod 2^b$. Hence, the operations are lossless.

Security: The scheme defined by encrypting x with x + k is IND-CPA secure as long as k is pseudorandom and unique between encryptions as shown in [15, 14, 85] which our scheme fulfills yielding semantic security under both adversary models.

5.1.2 Multiplication. Is defined on an abelian multiplicative group \mathbb{Z}_d^* with the order d > 1 equal to the datatype length where we use a pre-selected generator g of the group. Modulo division is equivalent to multiplying by the modular inverse of a number.

Encryption: we encrypt values as:

$$c_{i}[j] = \begin{cases} x_{i}[j] \times g^{F_{k_{e}}(k_{i}^{s}+k_{c}+j)} & i=P-1\\ x_{i}[j] \times g^{F_{k_{e}}(k_{i}^{s}+k_{c}+j)-F_{k_{e}}(k_{i+1}^{s}+k_{c}+j)} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$
(2)

Decryption: We decrypt as $D_{\mathbb{S}}(c[j]) = c[j] \times g^{-F_{k_e}(k_0^s + k_c + j)}$.

Losslessness: As g is a generator, each noise used for encryption in Equation 2 has an inverse implying no loss of information due to inverse multiplication in modulo arithmetic.

Security: The scheme is IND-CPA secure under both adversary models as the keys are unique and pseudorandom as shown in [85].

5.1.3 Logical and binary XOR. Are defined similarly to AES, where *d* equals the datatype length.

Encryption: we encrypt values as:

$$c_{i}[j] = \begin{cases} x_{i}[j] \oplus F_{k_{e}}(k_{i}^{s} + k_{c} + j) & i = P - 1\\ x_{i}[j] \oplus F_{k_{e}}(k_{i}^{s} + k_{c} + j) \oplus F_{k_{e}}(k_{i+1}^{s} + k_{c} + j) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$
(3)

Decryption: We decrypt as $D_{\mathbb{S}}(c[j]) = c[j] \oplus F_{k_e}(k_0^s + k_c + j)$. **Loss of information:** XOR is inverible and follows $a \oplus a = 0$, $a \oplus 0 = a$ yielding losslessness.

Security: The scheme is equivalent to the IND-CPA AES-CTR algorithm [31, 30] under both adversary models due to the unique and pseudorandom inputs provided.

5.1.4 *Performance.* Apart from simple algebraic operations, our methods require evaluating two PRFs for encryption and one for decryption. Additionally, encryption and decryption in multiplication require $O(\log d)$ modulo exponentiation. As our modulo is 2^n , techniques such as the 2^k -ary method can improve the worst-case performance [43].

To improve performance, we use the canceling technique [14, 85]. For all the methods, the noise from process i + 1 is eliminated by the noise from process *i*. This lowers the overall number of operations. The version of the scheme presented in Figure 1 is implemented without the aforementioned cancellation. The encryption then has one PRF evaluation, but decryption involves computing $\bigcirc_{i \in \mathbb{S}} F_{k_e}(k_s^i + k_c + j)$ scaling as $\theta(P)$ instead of $\theta(1)$.

5.2 Fixed point operations

Fixed point transmissions can be implemented similarly to integer transmissions. The implicit scaling factor has to be agreed upon before any computations and is shared securely with all ranks. Calculations rely on the same algorithms as in the integer case. The number of involved processes can be used to obtain the correct output scaling factor for multiplication and division. Fixed point arithmetic is helpful in some machine learning applications involving quantization and inference [48, 63, 56, 35, 53, 69] and is often used as a replacement for floating points in HE schemes [17, 24].

5.3 Floating point operations

While floats form the basis for most scientific computing, to the best of our knowledge, there does not exist a floating point HE framework that would be performant. To address this gap, we introduce HFP, a part of HEAR. Before formally discussing HFP in Section 5.3.1, we make the following assumption about the representation of a floating point number a with a sign bit s, a base b, an exponent e, and mantissa m:

$$a = (-1)^{s} \times m \times b^{e} = (-1)^{s} \times 1.m_{1}m_{2}...m_{l_{m}} \times b^{e_{1}e_{2}...e_{l_{e}}}$$
(4)

We assume *e* of binary length l_e and *m* of binary length l_m . We set the mantissa *m* to a normalized hidden one format where the leading one is implicit and is not stored in the underlying binary representation. We set the exponent *e* to a two's complement format. We define the set of values this encoding represents as \mathbb{F} . While similar to the IEEE 754 standard [54], we do not limit ourselves to its specifics (subnormals, special numbers, offset stored exponents, etc.). The base *b* is agreed upon a prior (e.g., 2 in IEEE 754).

5.3.1 Cryptographic scheme. We formally define a floating point encryption scheme HFP=(gen, enc, dec) relying on multiplying the float x by a noise. Beforehand, we provide the intuition behind it. We first move from a representation such as IEEE 754 to one that operates on a ring of values. We then place the floats along such a ring, ensuring that multiplication or addition can be evaluated. The adversary does not know the shifting in the ring, which provides security. The float value ring is achieved by creating a ring on the exponents. In the case of addition, we expand the exponent length by two bits and introduce a new addition arithmetic. In the case of multiplication, we turn the exponent into a ring without expansion. Both might require hardware changes, as explained in Section 5.3.6.

A different perspective to look at this scheme is by considering log number systems [59, 92] where the multiplication of arguments turns into an addition of their logarithms. Moving the floating point into a logarithmic space allows us to change the encoding from Equation 4 to fixed point integers, enabling the same security as in the integer case. SC '23, November 12-17, 2023, Denver, CO, USA

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		Int,4	bits, modulo 2 ⁴ =	Float, half precision ($l_e = 5$, $l_m = 10$)						
	MPI_SUM (sec. 5.1.1)		MPI_PROD	MPI_BXOF	R (sec. 5.1.3)	MPI_SUM (sec. 5.3.3)	MPI_PROD (sec. 5.3.2)		
	Rank 1	Rank 2	Rank 1	Rank 2	Rank 1	Rank 2	Rank 1	Rank 2	Rank 1	Rank 2
Values Expected	[1, 5] [3, 8] [4, 13]		[2, 4] [7, 2] [14, 8]		0011 0010 0001		$\begin{array}{r} 1.75 \times 2^7 & 1.25 \times 2^9 \\ 1.6875 \times 2^9 \end{array}$		$\begin{array}{r} \hline 1.125 \times 2^9 & 1.375 \times 2^1 \\ 1.547 \times 2^{10} \end{array}$	
Noise Method Encrypted	[2, 1] Add	[1, 7] (eq. 1) [4, 15]	$[3^{1} = 3,3^{2} = 9]$ Multiply [2, 4]	$\begin{bmatrix} 3^1 = 3, 3^0 = 1 \end{bmatrix}$ y (eq. 2) [5, 2]	0101 XOR 1111	1001 (eq. 3) 1011	$\frac{1.5 \times 2^{13}}{\text{Multiply (eq. 7)}}$ 1 3125 × 2 ²¹ 1 875 × 2 ²²		1.75×2 ²² Multipl 1.575×2 ⁴⁴	$\frac{1.25 \times 2^{-13}}{\text{y (eq. 6)}}$
Reduced	[6, 14]		[10, 8]		0100		1.266×2 ²³		1.354×2 ³³	
De-noise Method Decrypted	[2, 1] Subtract [4, 13]		$[3^{-1} = 11, 9^{-1} = 9]$ Multiply [14, 8]		0101 XOR 0001		$ 1.5 \times 2^{13} \\ Divide \\ 1.6875 \times 2^{9} $		1.75×2^{22} Divide 1.547×2^{10}	

Table 3: Simplified examples of encryption and decryption for different schemes and operations. Note that 3 is only a subgroup generator used for illustrative purposes and does not provide the required security.

Similarly to the key generation procedure at the beginning of Section 5, we assume a PRF $F_k(x)$ mapping inputs of length n and generating values in \mathbb{F} . n is a user-selectable security parameter, and the size d of the output of the PRF is the size of the encrypted floating point data type plus γ . γ represents a user-selectable parameter controlling the inflation of the data type and its tradeoff with precision loss and COA security. γ is at least zero and is discussed further in the section.

gen (1^n) : generate a symmetric key from uniform $k \in \{0, 1\}^n$.

enc(k, x): choose uniform $r \in \{0, 1\}^n$. Consider plaintext $x \in \mathbb{F}$ decomposed as $(-1)^{s_x} \times m_x \times 2^{e_x}$ and noise $F_k(r) \in \mathbb{F}$ as $(-1)^{s_f} \times m_f \times 2^{e_f}$ where $l_{m_f} = l_{m_x} - \delta + \gamma$ and $l_{e_f} = l_{e_x} + \delta$. Output the ciphertext c:

$$c = x \otimes F_k(r) = (-1)^{s'} \times m' \times 2^{e'}$$
(5)

where \otimes is defined such that $s' = s_x + s_f \mod 2$, $m' = m_x \times m_f$ and $e' = e_x + e_f \mod 2^{l_e + \delta}$. The resulting m' should be of length $l_m - \delta + \gamma$. If m' is not in the hidden one format, it must be normalized by shifting.

 δ is necessary for correct functioning and security purposes as described in Section 5.3.5. δ introduces additional bits to the exponent, increasing its length. The value of δ depends on which homomorphic operation the encryption should support. It equals zero for multiplication and two for addition. γ controls precision loss due to encryption/decryption by adding ciphertext inflation bits to the representation. The optimal choice of γ depends on the supported homomorphic operation. The most performant operations would be aligned with current data type lengths, implying γ equal to zero for multiplication and two for additions.

dec(k, r, c): output the plaintext $x = c \otimes F_k(r)^{-1}$ where $F_k(r)^{-1} = (-1)^{s_f} \times 1/m_f \times 2^{-e_f}$ with appropriate mantissa normalization.

Security: we discuss the scheme's security. In HFP, both sign and exponent bits operate on arithmetic rings. As such, they produce uniform outputs, giving the adversary no advantage other than brute-forcing over possible keys and finding the one providing the seen output. However, as we multiply mantissas in our encryption, the resulting ciphertexts will not be uniform but produce a piecewise smooth logarithmic distribution [28]. Such probability distribution gives the adversary a statistical advantage as some plaintexts are more likely to produce specific ciphertexts. We show that this statistical edge is negligible and evaluate it by considering a probabilistic polynomial time adversary \mathcal{A} . \mathcal{A} can use Bayesian statistics [95] to find the optimal strategy to obtain an edge over a simple brute-force attack. \mathcal{A} implements a maximum a posteriori (MAP) [38] estimator for the plaintext X based on ciphertext C. \mathcal{A} observes ciphertext c and makes a guess x_g as:

$$c_{q|c} = \operatorname{argmax}_{x} \Pr(X = x | C = c)$$

Using Bayesian rules and Pr(C = c) being independent of *X*:

$$x_{q|c} \sim \operatorname{argmax}_{x} \Pr(C = c|X = x) \Pr(X = x)$$

We assume an uninformative uniform prior Pr(X = x) over all possible mantissa leading to the likelihood:

$$x_{a|c} \sim \operatorname{argmax}_{x} \Pr(C = c|X = x)$$

 \mathcal{A} obtains the likelihood by measuring possible ciphertexts given the random output of the PRF. We examined the average probability of success for MAP for FP32 to measure the statistical edge \mathcal{A} gets through our encryption. For each possible mantissa X we measured all the possible ciphertexts C by iterating over all the possible PRF outputs. Assuming that PRF outputs are uniform, we obtained the likelihood by normalizing the results. Adversary \mathcal{A} achieves the average probability of a guess of 3.57×10^{-7} . The maximum probability of a guess over all of X is 3.58×10^{-7} and the minimal 2.38×10^{-7} . The reference uniform probability of a guess is 1.19×10^{-7} . The adversary \mathcal{A} only obtains a minor advantage.

Importantly, this type of attack can easily become unfeasible for the adversary \mathcal{A} . As the number of possible PRF outputs grows exponentially with the data type size (γ controllable), attacking through such a ciphertext attack is impractical, displaying COA properties. Additionally, obtaining keys and inputs of the PRF through this strategy is also not viable as the key space grows exponentially with the number of key bits *n*, assuming that the PRF is secure and that the input of the PRF is random between encryptions.

5.3.2 *Multiplication.* We base multiplication on canceling the noise between nodes and the exponent logic described in Section 5.3.5 without any exponent inflation ($\delta = 0$).

Encryption: we encode values as in equation 4. Then $x_i[j]$ can be encrypted to a ciphertext $c_i[j]$ assuming the same definition of



Figure 3: The precision loss against the different floating point types for multiplication and addition operations. γ signifies the number of bits by which the ciphertext has expanded to reduce precision loss.

 \otimes as in Section 5.3.1 and equation 5 as:

$$c_{i}[j] = \begin{cases} x_{i}[j] \otimes \frac{F_{k_{e}}(k_{i}^{s}+k_{c}+j)}{F_{k_{e}}(k_{i+1}^{s}+k_{c}+j)} & i = P-1\\ x_{i}[j] \otimes F_{k_{e}}(k_{i}^{s}+k_{c}+j) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$
(6)

Decryption: we decrypt as $D_{\mathbb{S}}(c[j]) = c[j] \otimes F_{k_c}^{-1}(k_0^s + k_c + j)$. **Loss of information:** multiplication and division in the scheme

Loss of information: multiplication and division in the scheme introduce precision loss. To evaluate how much information is lost when passing through encryption and decryption, we used a multiple precision floating point number framework MPFR [36] based on GMP [46]. We ran 10,000 iterations, summing 10,000 randomly selected floats, resulting in an exponential sampling of values. Such sums are representative of typical numbers observed in the working conditions of HEAR. We measured the loss by comparing the absolute difference between the value after passing through HEAR and the native float value relative to the sum obtained using 1024 bits of precision. Figure 3 presents the relative precision loss against the floating point type used for multiplication. The precision differs from the native version by about one-tenth of an order of magnitude. We did not expand the ciphertext for multiplication, implying $\gamma = 0$. In the case of multiplication $\delta = 0$, hence, we operate on the same precision as normal floats.

Security: as shown in section 5.3.1, the scheme is COA secure. The multiplication scheme is robust against both adversary models and provides all three types of safety.

5.3.3 Addition. We base addition on the expanded exponent logic described in Section 5.3.5.

Encryption: we encode values as in equation 4. Then $x_i[j]$ can be encrypted to a ciphertext $c_i[j]$ assuming the same definition of \otimes as in Section 5.3.1 and equation 5 as:

$$c_i[j] = \mathcal{E}(x_i[j]) = x \otimes F_{k_e}(k_c + j) \tag{7}$$

Decryption: we decrypt as: $D_{\mathbb{S}}(c[j]) = c[j] \otimes F_{k_c}^{-1}(k_c + j)$.

Loss of information: analogously to the multiplication operation, division, and multiplication introduce information loss. Figure 3 also presents the relative precision loss against the floating point type used for addition. The results are obtained similarly to the multiplication case with larger sums of 100,000 elements. We present three cases for ciphertext inflation. The best for precision is $\gamma = 2$. However, it yields two additional bits in the representation, losing some advantages of INC. Similarly to multiplication, the precision loss is only a small part of the order of magnitude. In the worst case ($\gamma = 0$), the precision drops slightly less than an order of magnitude.

Security: as shown in section 5.3.1, the scheme is COA secure. The addition scheme is robust against the single-process adversary model where the adversary can only infer a single message, and global safety is unnecessary. This is crucial as the addition only provides temporal and local safety.

5.3.4 Alternative addition. We provide an alternative addition scheme that sacrifices performance and precision for more robust security for applications that require global safety. We base it on the multiplication of exponents. We first encode the values as exponents of an exponential function and then reduce them multiplicatively, which implies a sum of their exponents. We then decode the values after the decryption.

Encryption: we encode the values as $x_i[j] \rightarrow e^{x_i[j]} = a_i(x_i[j])$. We then use the multiplicative float scheme to send the values a_i .

Decryption: after obtaining the product $A = e^{\sum_{i \in S} a_i}$ we decode by taking the logarithm as $\log(A) = \sum_{i \in S} x[j]$.

Loss of information: Exponentiation leads to decreased dynamic range and loss of precision. This is especially true for values far from the origin. The method is useful when the values are known to be in a small range, e.g., in machine learning weights [90] which are normalized [82].

Security: the scheme provides the same security guarantees as multiplication.

5.3.5 Exponent logic. We introduce a new exponent arithmetic, which is conducted modulo $l_e + \delta$ where l_e is the length of the exponent of the original floating point, δ is zero for multiplication and two for addition. The modifications are necessary due to security reasons. We first describe the logic for conceptually simpler multiplication and move to addition afterward. We use the exponent with $l_e = 4$ (from 0 to 15) as an example to display the concepts.

Floating point multiplication is normally conducted by adding two exponents, multiplying the mantissas, and normalizing the result. Multiplying two numbers as described in Section 5.3.1 could lead to an exponent overflow. The typical IEEE standard would cap those values at the maximum infinity exponent. However, we cannot have such a cap if we consider encryption. For example, if the adversary knows that infinity has exponent $2^{l_e} - 1 = 15$, they also know that the maximum possible exponent is encrypted as 14, allowing for arbitrary decryption by mapping all other exponents and breaking any security guarantees. Thus, we allow the exponent to operate like a ring in our multiplicative case. Multiplications and divisions can then be reverted, and message exponents get encoded randomly along the ring, yielding the same security guarantees for the exponents as in the integer case.

The addition is more complex. Typical floating point addition works by comparing the exponents of two numbers, shifting the mantissa of the one with the smaller exponent by the difference between the exponents, and adding the mantissas. If we assume two floats f_1 and f_2 , and two random numbers r_1 and r_2 , once multiplied together $f_1r_1 + f_2r_2$, the sum of $f_1 + f_2$ cannot be extracted because of different scales. Thus, all the numbers within one summation chain need to be scaled with the same random number to preserve the order of the numbers. Furthermore, we lose the order if we consider multiplication between f_1r_1 that overflows the exponent. For example, a number with exponent $2^{l_e} - 1 = 15$ can be encrypted to an exponent equal to 0, making it the smallest number. This is crucial for addition as comparing two exponents decides which number gets shifted and by how much. We propose a solution to this problem by expanding the exponent by one bit and using this structure in a novel way. The comparison operator now changes to two comparisons. For two exponents, e_1 and e_2 , we calculate $e_1 - e_2$ and $e_2 - e_1$. We choose the smaller of the two as the difference and treat the number from which the other was subtracted as the larger one. Notably, only the smaller difference will correspond to a valid exponent. For example, for the aforementioned $l_e = 4$, we would work in arithmetic modulo $2^{l_e+1} = 32$. Then, if we assume $e_1 = 2$ and $e_2 = 21$, $e_1 - e_2 = 13$ and $e_2 - e_1 = 19$. Note that 19 is not a valid exponent, so $e_1 > e_2$ for the addition operation. Finally, when encrypting as described in Section 5.3.1, the maximum result of mantissa multiplication in the case of two mantissas having just binary ones is above 2, which requires shifting the mantissa to the right and adding one to the exponent. However, this additional one can again break the order. For example, for $e_1 = 31$ and $e_2 = 16$, if encryption increases e_1 by one due to mantissa overflow, $e_1 = 0$ gives indistinguishable exponents as both differences are equal to 16. Thus, we must increase the exponent by one more bit. The resulting ciphertext exponent has two more bits than the plaintext.

Increasing the exponent range without allowing overflow is invalid, making the scheme vulnerable to rainbow table type attacks [61]. For example, suppose we do not allow overflows, set $e_1 = 15$, and the exponent of random noise $e_r = 16$. Then $e_1+e_r = 31$. In that case, the adversary knows this number could be obtained only with one combination of maximum plaintext exponent and maximum random noise exponent.

5.3.6 Limitations. As Section 5.3.5 points, HEAR cannot directly support any caps such as Infinity, not a number (NaN), zero, or any other special number due to security constraints. Zero gets first encoded as the smallest possible number and then treated as such. The support for NaN or Infinity could be added with a special bit indicating such a status. However, the bits of the mantissa, exponent, and sign must still be scrambled. An alternative approach to detect zero or infinity is using additional exponent bits, which would signal an under- or overflow if still set after decryption. This is already provided by addition. Furthermore, as HEAR is incompatible with IEEE 754, floating point operations in HEAR require changes in the FPU. The new FPU can be emulated in software if the INC hardware allows for this. Otherwise, HEAR requires hardware changes enabling features such as working on nonstandard exponents described in Section 5.3.5. Alternative schemes have been developed to replace IEEE 754 [49], for which HEAR could also be suitable. Finally, HEAR operates on a tradeoff of precision and ciphertext inflation (quantified by γ). The lost precision can be compensated for by additional bits, which increases bandwidth usage.

5.4 Other operations

In HEAR, the orders of magnitude faster operation than in other schemes comes from the invertible nature of encryption. All of our schemes rely on the existence of an easily computable inverse operation. However, some logical operations such as AND and OR have no inverse and cannot be easily ported to our framework. These could be implemented as summations where if the sum is zero, OR and AND are zero. If it's P, OR, and AND are one. Otherwise, OR is one, and AND is zero. Yet, this considerably increases bandwidth usage as our ciphertext grows as $O(\log_2 P)$.

Furthermore, some operations such as min and max are not allowed due to security constraints. If we enable the network to compare two values and determine which is larger, the adversary can encrypt an increasing set of values and determine the plaintext. Thus, all these operations must either use FHE schemes or be performed within the TEEs.

Similarly, arbitrary user-defined functions are not allowed due to the same security concerns. The users can specify functions based on the implemented schemes as long as these use only one operation type or are preprocessed in a secure environment. For example, to implement a variance calculation of a random variable X with mean zero, the nodes can compute X_i^2 on their samples and sum the results using HEAR. Furthermore, one can freely implement INC functions that combine modes of supported operations, e.g., adding data from even ranks and subtracting data from odd ranks.

5.5 Result verification

While we covered the confidentiality of data, we have not discussed verification. If the secure environment within which we run the application is based on TEEs, some of them might require integrity protection [25]. HE is malleable by design [14] and provides no integrity checks. This issue can be resolved by adding a homomorphic message authentication code (HoMAC) [16] derived from the encrypted values. While conceptually similar to normal MACs, HoMACs enable conducting homomorphic operations on the data and produce tags that authenticate the computation [16]. More precisely, each rank generates a tag $\sigma_i[j]$ for each ciphertext in the Allreduce vector $c_i[j]$, and sends to the network a pair of values (σ , $c_i[j]$). σ is computed as:

$$\sigma = \text{HoMAC}_{s_i[j]}(c_i[j]) = \frac{s_i[j] - c_i}{Z} \mod p$$

where $c_i[j]$ is the ciphertext, $s_i[j]$ is per ciphertext homomorphic key generated randomly, *Z* the overall verification key and *p* a prime number of length λ bits. λ represents a security parameter. INC conducts a sum over all of the pairs $\sum_{i \in \mathbb{S}} (c_i[j], \sigma_i[j]) = (c_t[j], \sigma_t[j])$. After the reduction, the ranks verify that $\sum_{i \in \mathbb{S}} s_i[j]$ is equal to $c_t[j] + \sigma_t Z \mod p$. The operations can be improved by using a canceling method similar to the one in Sections 5.1-5.3 [14]:

$$\sigma = \operatorname{HoMAC}_{s_i[j]}(c_i[j]) = \frac{s_i[j] - s_{i+1}[j] - c_i}{Z} \mod p$$

where we ignored the edge conditions for rank 0 analogous to the encryption case. While HoMACs solve the problem of result verification, they are not free. The overhead is linear with the security parameter and might cause more than 200% inflation for reasonable 64-bit *p*. Additionally, the version of the scheme for



Figure 4: The latency breakdown of the critical path for a 16 Bytes MPI_Allreduce integer summation call on two ranks for two methods and their overheads as a percentage of the communication time measured with 100,000 iterations.



Figure 5: The encryption throughput for different PRNG methods as measured with 100 iterations on a single node. The standard deviation displays the performance across multiple buffer sizes.

multiplication [16] is scaling as 2^N where *N* is the number of operations. Assuming log *N* INC operations, the space overhead grows as $\theta(N)$ and is not scalable. To the best of our knowledge, HoMACs for the XOR operation and floats do not exist.

6 IMPLEMENTATION

We describe libhear, the end-to-end implementation of HEAR. libhear is a middleware C++ library that adds encryption and decryption functionality to MPI_Allreduce using PMPI and resides between the application and the MPI runtime. As libhear is based on the PMPI interface, it is MPI implementation-independent. Additionally, libhear does not change the code base or require application recompilation. To enable MPI_Allreduce encryption, the user only needs to conduct an LD_PRELOAD of libhear while running the MPI job. We discuss how libhear implements the steps of HEAR and how we optimized the library for performance, including implementing vectorization, AES-NI instructions, a memory pool, and network pipelining. Finally, we describe the experimental setup for all the results in Section 7.

Initialization: libhear performs the required key generation, exchange, and per rank state initialization of HEAR during communicator creation (e.g., MPI_Init, MPI_Comm_create. After initialization, libhear intercepts the MPI_Allreduce calls and performs encryption and decryption for specific data and operation types, including MPI_INT with MPI_SUM, and MPI_FLOAT with MPI_SUM.

Cryptographic operations: libhear provides a highly optimized version of encryption and decryption for the x86 ISA. We refined our implementation to enable two scenarios with distinct performance requirements targeted by INC:

- (1) High-throughput for large message sizes (e.g., 16 MiB) and 100-800s Gbit/s link bandwidths.
- (2) μs-scale latency of inter-process synchronization focusing on small messages such as 16 B.

As critical path profiling of naïve HEAR implementation suggests in Figure 4, the PRF calls are the largest contributor to the time of encryption. We focused on choosing the best PRF for our needs. We investigated multiple possibilities and focused on SHA1 [32] and AES [31] as primary candidates who achieve good performance [93].

High-throughput scenario: Figure 5 shows encryption and decryption throughput of HEAR on a single Intel Xeon E5-2695 v4 @ 2.10GHz core for both integer and float summation. The vectorized integer implementation using OpenSSL [94] SHA1 achieves less than 1GB/s/core for encryption and decryption predominantly because of the lack of hardware acceleration. We optimized performance by utilizing 128-bit AES-NI x86 ISA extensions [4]. We combined AES-NI with loop unrolling to enable automatic SSE2 128-bit vectorization by the compiler. Such a version achieves 5GB/s/core for encryption and 11.7GB/s/core for decryption. To further improve performance, we hand-tuned SSE2 vectorization, which increases encryption and decryption throughput up to 9GB/s/core and 18GB/s/core. In libhear, SHA1 is unsuitable for modern (100-200 Gbit/s) and emerging (400-800 Gbit/s) HPC network line rates, while the AES-NI can saturate them with a modest number of one to five processes per node (PPN).

Using the insights from integer experiments, we avoided SHA and focused on AES for floats. We developed two variations for float summation: non-vectorized and loop unrolled versions. Even without hand-tuning, the automatically vectorized variant is an order of magnitude faster than the Aries NIC bandwidth of 0.347GB/s/core.

Low-latency scenario: Figure 4 displays the latency breakdown for the critical path of integer summation collected with x86 RDTSC counters. Similarly to the throughput case, SHA1 is worse and introduces larger latencies than AES-NI. The hardware-enhanced AES-NI also reduces CPU cycle overhead for small messages to 7.1% compared to SHA1-based libhear implementation achieving 75.5%. We selected AES-NI-based implementation as the PRF backend of libhear and conducted all further experiments on such a version.

Communication: To further optimize libhear for data-heavy applications such as gradient summing in distributed ML [8], we exploit non-blocking MPI collectives and implement network pipelining. We use non-blocking MPI_Iallreduce to overlap the processing of receive and send buffers with communication. Specifically, we overlap the decryption of n - 1th send-buffer block and encryption of n + 1th block with the encrypted nth block reduction done in the network or the MPI implementation.



Figure 6: The 16MiB encryption/decryption throughput for different pipelining blocks as measured with 1000 iterations. We show for reference the non-pipelined, synchronous Naïve version and the baseline Cray MPICH. We display the fraction of performance as compared to Cray MPICH.

Memory allocation: During libhear initialization, we preallocate a page-aligned memory pool to handle intermediate send buffer blocks. The memory pool helps to avoid dynamic memory allocation with malloc and alleviates the cost of memory registration (pinning) done by the underlying MPI implementation on the Remote Direct Memory Access (RDMA) data path [65]. Figure 6 displays the throughput per rank achieved with different block sizes. With an optimal block size of 131-262KiB, we achieved nearly 0.27GB/s/rank, which is 14% less than the native Cray MPICH at full CPU utilization (i.e., 36 PPN).

Results validation: We validated the correctness of MPI_FLOAT scheme in libhear by running 10 million iterations of number encryption-decryption. Observed relative error of numbers after decryption varied from the original number by average 1.3×10^{-7} . MPI_INT summation correctness was verified by comparing the contents of MPI_Allreduce receive buffers of libhear and reference MPI implementation using std::memcmp function.

7 EVALUATION

We evaluate the overhead of libhear for communication on a supercomputing system Piz Daint [75]. We deploy our workloads on compute nodes with two 18-core Intel Xeon E5-2695 v4 @ 2.10GHz CPUs based on the Broadwell microarchitecture coupled with 128 GB of DDR3 memory. Piz Daint is based on the 100Gbit/s Aries interconnect. We compile our code with clang (v.13.0.1) and -03 -ffast-math -march=native flags and use Cray MPICH (PrgEnv-cray/6.0.10) as a reference MPI implementation. We evaluate the latency and throughput scaling of libhear using OSU micro-benchmarks (v7.1) [71]. We then analyze its influence on the performance of a set of deep neural network (DNN) proxy applications relying heavily on Allreduce [52]. Similarly to Section 6, we focus on two crucial aspects of INC, throughput improvements for large messages and latency improvements for small messages.

7.1 Scaling benchmarks

Throughput: For large messages, we evaluate libhear throughput scaling with respect to the number of MPI ranks. Figure 7 shows



Figure 7: The scaling of the MPI_Allreduce throughput as the number of ranks increases with two sections: PPN scaling on two nodes and node scaling. The boundaries display min/max range while the lines are the means. HEAR scales consistently and achieves about 80% of Cray MPICH's throughput.



Figure 8: The scaling of the MPI_Allreduce latency as the number of ranks. We show two scaling sections: PPN on two nodes and > 2 nodes. The boundaries display min/max while the lines are the means. HEAR scales well with low overhead.

the throughput of libhear alongside the native Cray MPICH for integer summations. We run two trials with 1000 iterations each. We display two sections: PPN scaling and node scaling. For the PPN scaling, we increased the number of ranks on a two-node allocation without increasing the number of nodes. For the node scaling, we doubled the number of nodes at each iteration. At its peak, Cray MPICH reaches 11.1GB/s, steadily reducing the performance afterward due to communication overhead between the nodes. At its peak, libhear reaches a throughput of 9.5GB/s, achieving 85% of Cray's MPICH bandwidth. libhear scales in the same way as Cray MPICH, consistently achieving around 80% of the performance provided by the native implementation.

Latency: We evaluate libhear 16B latency scaling with respect to the number of ranks. Figure 8 shows the latency of libhear alongside the native Cray MPICH for integer summations. We run two trials with 100,000 iterations each. Similarly to the throughput experiment, we display two sections: PPN scaling and node scaling. For the PPN scaling, we increased the number of ranks on a twonode system without increasing the number of nodes. For the node scaling, we doubled the number of nodes at each iteration. As expected, the two sections display different scaling. libhear is again scaling like the native Cray MPICH and does not introduce significant latency overhead. As the number of ranks increases, the noise within the network grows considerably [26], as visible by the minimum and maximum range. This leads to libhear achieving even lower latency than Cray MPICH, indicating minimal overhead libhear introduces. The overhead is small enough to hide within the network noise for a larger number of ranks.

HEAR: Homomorphically Encrypted Allreduce



Figure 9: Simulated relative average execution time of one iteration of distributed DNN training while running with HEAR as normalized to without it. GPT3 training parallelized across 384 ranks (48 nodes, 8 PPN); ResNet-152, DLRM, and CosmoFlow scaled to 256 MPI ranks (8 nodes, 32 PPN).

7.2 Performance of DNN training

We also assess overheads from libhear using several distributed deep neural network (DNN) training proxy-workloads [52]. We select this workload as a significant part of the distributed Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) neural network training algorithm consists of a gradient averaging using Allreduce [8]. As such, we consider DNN training as a worst-case scenario, giving a realistic upper bound of the libhear impact on the overall application throughput. In our setup, the gradient averaging part of distributed SGD is modeled using MPI_Allreduce with MPI_FLOAT (FP32) data type with message size proportional to the number of model parameters.

In Figure 9, we report simulated performance overheads of one training iteration for ResNet-152, GPT3, DLRM, and CosmoFlow models. We observe the highest overheads (1.31×) with ResNet-152 training, whose communication part consists of only Allreduce calls. For other models (i.e., DLRM, CosmoFlow, and GPT3) where the communication also includes the synchronization with other MPI collectives (e.g., MPI_Alltoall) and point-to-point operations, libhear introduces minor overhead that varies from 3% to 17.5%. We note that these overheads could be eliminated by further overlapping computation (i.e., training on GPUs) with non-blocking HEAR communication that could be implemented in hardware.

8 HEAR EXTENSIONS

HEAR is implemented in software and uses hardware acceleration for the PRF evaluation to enhance its encryption and decryption routines. However, some methods, such as converting a standard float to HEARs representation or addition and multiplication on the new type, create overhead that could be lowered by implementing the operations in hardware.

Our open-source HEAR implementation, libhear, allows users to add new data types and operations transparently and with low overhead. It provides the PRF implementation in a vectorized, hardware-accelerated way, allowing for further high-performance expansion. While Allreduce and Reduce are the most commonly used collectives, HEAR can be extended to other collectives such as broadcast, all-to-all, scatter, and gather communication. These would work similarly to Allreduce, however, without any INC. One-to-one communication can also be implemented using a matrix of keys rather than a constant number of keys. However, this scales as $\theta(N)$ in space, worse than $\theta(1)$ of the other HEAR methods. In one-to-one communication, HEAR could be used for atomic operations. Such broad support might be significant if HEAR is implemented in hardware. It can then avoid having multiple encryption standards over the same communication layer.

9 CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

HEAR shows that cHPC can be achieved while maintaining crucial performance. However, HEAR only opens the discussion about cHPC in the community. cHPC poses fundamental challenges where the additional security introduces latency, energy, and silicon costs taking resources from other performance features. Even relatively simple algorithms such as AES can have overcomplicated implementations that reach 4.2 cycles/byte/thread [4] of encryption and decryption while using 275pJ/bit of energy [1]. While this can be acceptable for long-distance networks, performance on integrated and short-distance links such as CXL [87] might suffer. Furthermore, the current TEE ecosystem does not support cHPC. Challenges such as lack of Non-Uniform Memory Access (NUMA) [6] and RDMA [93] support, hardening and optimizing HPC libraries like Open MPI [37], creating scalable distributed attestation [22], and enhancing resource orchestrators such as Slurm [99] remain open. Despite all challenges, cHPC can enable performance-hungry personalized medicine (e.g., AI-based gene analysis, private chatbot doctors) and finance (e.g., preventing fraud, running hedge-fund proprietary algorithms) [67, 66]. cHPC offers strong security guarantees, where no confidential data is shared with the computing agent and where computation results can be entrusted. As HEAR demonstrates, by leveraging fundamental and streamlined security technologies such as novel homomorphic computing schemes, we can achieve these security gains while preserving performance.

10 CONCLUSIONS

We presented HEAR, a first-of-a-kind framework supporting homomorphically encrypted Allreduce operation enabling confidential INC. Unlike many HE schemes, HEAR is geared toward the specific security needs of HPC. To quantify those, we presented a threat model corresponding to the common HPC adversaries, which concerned itself with local, global, and temporal safety. We also outlined HEAR and its design. HEAR operates on both integers and floats with variable security. It requires no or little changes in the hardware it is running on. HEAR is either lossless or causes only a small amount of precision loss. HEAR does not require ciphertext inflation, which can be introduced to recover precision. We also discussed how result verification can be supported within HEAR.

We prototyped HEAR in the form of libhear, allowing users to run it on top of their applications without recompiling. We have optimized libhear's performance for two common INC cases: small latency and large message throughput. We showed that libhear's overhead is small in both synthetic and application benchmarks for the provided security and performance benefits from enabling INC. Finally, we open-sourced libhear. We believe HEAR represents the first milestone towards cHPC.

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